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This article investigates the relationship between visual mental representations and spatial
mental representations in human visuo-spatial processing. By comparing two common
theories of visuo-spatial processing – mental model theory and the theory of mental
imagery – we identified two open questions: (1) which representations are modality-
specific, and (2) what is the role of the two representations in reasoning.Two experiments
examining eye movements and preferences for under-specified problems were conducted
to investigate these questions. We found that significant spontaneous eye movements
along the processed spatial relations occurred only when a visual mental representation is
employed, but not with a spatial mental representation. Furthermore, the preferences for
the answers of the under-specified problems differed between the two mental represen-
tations. The results challenge assumptions made by mental model theory and the theory
of mental imagery.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Our everyday behavior relies on our ability to process visual and
spatial information. Describing the route to work, taking another
person’s perspective, or imagining a familiar face or object all
depend on our capability to process and reason with visual and
spatial information.
Two main theoretic frameworks of visual and spatial knowledge
processing have been proposed in cognitive science: mental model
theory (Johnson-Laird, 1989, 1998; Tversky, 1993) and mental
imagery (Finke, 1989; Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006). Fur-
thermore, there is also the conception of verbal or propositional
mental representations (Rips, 1994; Pylyshyn, 2002) that employ a
sort of logical inference to reason about visual and/or spatial infor-
mation. However, considerable evidence indicates that analogical
mental representations, i.e., mental models or mental images, can
better predict and explain the empirical data, in particular, for spa-
tial reasoning (e.g., Byrne and Johnson-Laird, 1989; Kosslyn, 1994;
Johnson-Laird, 2001).
In line with behavioral and neuroscientific evidence (e.g.,
Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982; Levine et al., 1985; Newcombe
et al., 1987; Farah et al., 1988; Courtney et al., 1996; Smith and
Jonides, 1997; Mellet et al., 2000; Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002;
Klauer and Zhao, 2004), mental model theory and the theory of
mental imagery both propose a distinction between spatial and
visual mental representations. The theory of mental imagery pro-
poses spatial mental images and visual mental images; mental
model theory proposes (spatial) mental models and visual men-
tal images. Research based on the theories has, however, mostly
focused on one of the two representations: the investigation of the
properties of visual mental images in the theory of mental imagery
and the investigation of reasoning with (spatial) mental models in
mental model theory. Consequently, the relationship and interac-
tion between the two types of mental representations is left largely
unspecified in both theories. Although initial attempts exist (e.g.,
Schultheis and Barkowsky, 2011) to explain how visual and spatial
mental representations interact and relate to each other, empirical
data on the issue is largely missing. Accordingly, the primary aim
of this article is to examine the differences and the relationship
between visual and spatial mental representations. To achieve this,
we first review how mental model theory on the one hand and the
theory of mental imagery on the other hand understand spatial
and visual mental representations as well as how they interpret the
relationship between them. Even though there is much theoretic
and empirical work on both theories, the literature lacks a system-
atic comparison of the theories. In the following, we present such
a comparison. From this comparison, it will become clear that the
theories actually propose very similar conceptions of spatial and
visual mental representations but that their foci of investigation
are mostly on different aspects and include phenomena not inves-
tigated within the respectively other theory. We examined these
different aspects and used them in our experiments to gain new
insights into the open issues of the relationship between visual
and spatial mental representations. The results can be applied to
complement gaps in the two theories.
2. THEORIES
2.1. MENTAL MODEL THEORY
Mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1998) postulates that there
are three representational levels involved in human thinking:
propositional representations, mental models, and mental images.
The relationships between these three levels are hierarchical in the
sense that their construction depends on each other. The following
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example helps to illustrate this point. Three-term series prob-
lems (Johnson-Laird, 1972) are common experimental tasks in the
study of mental models. They contain two premises and one con-
clusion that has to be validated or inferred based on the premises.
Let the two premises be “A is left of B” and “B is right of C”
and let the to-be-drawn conclusion be the relationship between
A and C. According to mental model theory the premises are
first encoded propositionally. From these propositional premises
a mental model of the described configuration is constructed. As
it is an essential property of mental models that “the structural
relations between the parts of the model are analogous to the
structural relations in the world” (Johnson-Laird, 1998, p. 447),
one valid mental model of our example can be depicted in the
following way:
A C B
We note that a mental model is a special case of the situation
defined by the premises, because it only represents one valid situa-
tion with respect to the premises. For our example another mental
model that satisfies the premises is:
C A B
Just like the situation represented by a mental model is a spe-
cial case of what is described in the premises, mental model theory
poses that a mental image is a special case of a given mental model.
The mental image that is constructed from a mental model is
one specific instance out of many valid instances described by the
model, because the image has to specify, for example, the distance
between the entities. The underlying mental model is in contrast
invariant with respect to the distances. Summarizing the hier-
archical structure of mental model theory, we note that a mental
image is one out of many projections of the visualizable aspects of a
mental model, and a mental model is one out of many analogically
structured configurations that are valid given the propositionally
represented premises. This suggests a clear hierarchy in which it
is necessary to have the more general representations in order to
construct a more specific one.
Mental models are described to be analogically structured,
amodal, and abstract, e.g., they can represent abstract, non-
visualizable relations such as “smarter than.” In contrast, men-
tal images can only represent “visualizable” information and are
modality-specific to visual perception (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1998;
Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002). It has been suggested that the
analogical nature of mental models might be generally spatial
(Knauff et al., 2003), i.e., even reasoning with abstract relations
like “worse than” or “better than” is handled by a spatio-analogical
mental model. This view is supported by the association of mental
model reasoning with activation in the parietal lobe (e.g., Goel
and Dolan, 2001; Knauff et al., 2003), which is associated with
several processes of spatial cognition (for an overview, see Sack,
2009). It was found that the use of “visual” relations, e.g., “dirtier
than,” in relational reasoning tasks led to activation in the early
visual cortex in contrast to tasks with other (abstract) relations,
e.g., “worse than” (Knauff et al., 2003). The study also found that
“visual” relations led to longer reaction times and it was concluded
that tasks using such “visual” relations induce the employment of
visual mental images during the mental-model-based reasoning
process.
Most of the literature on mental model theory focuses on
how mental models explain reasoning. Johnson-Laird and Byrne
(1991) state that reasoning according to the mental model the-
ory consists of three stages: (1) the construction of one mental
model (construction phase), (2) the inspection of the mental
model (inspection phase), and (3) the variation of the mental
model (variation phase). Slightly simplified, the reasoning process
works as follows. One first mental model is constructed based
on the given premises. This model represents one situation that
is valid given the premises. This situation is inspected and can
yield a possible conclusion. This conclusion is then verified to
be valid in all other possible mental models that can be derived
from the premises. If a conclusion is not contradicted in the other
valid mental models, the conclusion is confirmed. There is much
empirical support for this three stage process in human reasoning
(e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2001). One interesting phenomenon in rea-
soning with mental models is the occurrence of preferred mental
models when there are multiple valid conclusions. An example for
such multiple valid conclusions are the two configurations “CAB”
and “ACB” of the above example. It can be observed that there
are reliable within-subject and between-subject preferences for
which model is constructed first out of several valid mental mod-
els. This firstly constructed mental model is termed a preferred
mental model. As a consequence, if there are several valid conclu-
sions that can be inferred, there is a preference for one conclusion
which corresponds to the preferred mental model. Preferred men-
tal models have been investigated in different domains, but in
particular in the domain of spatial reasoning (e.g., Rauh et al.,
2005; Jahn et al., 2007; Schultheis and Barkowsky, 2013).
2.2. THEORY OF MENTAL IMAGERY
The theory of mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2006)
makes a distinction between spatial mental images and visual
mental images. These two mental representations differ in the
content they represent and are distinct in their anatomical local-
ization. But they are both assumed to have a (at least partially)
spatio-analogical structure. Furthermore, there is also a propo-
sitional representation referred to as associative memory, which
contains propositional descriptions of the structure of an object
or a scene. This information can be used to construct spatial and
visual mental images. For the latter, however, one needs to further
retrieve encoded shape information from another source, i.e., the
object-properties-processing subsystem, which can be thought of
as a sort of non-analogical visual memory store located in the
temporal lobe.
Spatial mental images (sometimes referred to as object maps)
are located in the spatial-properties-processing subsystem in the
framework of Kosslyn (1994). They contain information about the
location, size, and orientation of entities. The spatial-properties-
processing subsystem is (at least partially) placed in the parietal
lobe. Given that areas of the parietal lobe are topographically
organized (Sereno et al., 2001), it is assumed that spatial mental
images are also at least partially spatio-analogical (Kosslyn et al.,
2006).
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Visual mental images are constructed and processed in a struc-
ture called the visual buffer. The visual buffer consists of the
topographically organized areas of the visual cortex. Visual men-
tal images are thus assumed to be spatio-analogical or “depictive,”
i.e., the metrics of what is represented, e.g., a shape, are reflected in
the metrics of the representation. Visual mental images represent
shape information, as well as, for example, color and depth.
A difference between spatial and visual mental images is that
spatial mental images contain more information, in the sense that
the current visual mental image in the visual buffer only contains
a “visualized” part of what is represented in the spatial mental
image (Kosslyn et al., 2006, p. 138). A visual mental image is a
specification of a part of a spatial mental image.
Four types of functions are proposed for visual and spatial
mental images: generation, inspection, maintenance, and manip-
ulation. The generation of a mental image can either be just the
retrieval of a spatial configuration of entities as a spatial men-
tal image if no visual information is necessary for a given task
or it can furthermore include the retrieval of shape information
to generate a visual mental image in the visual buffer. Note that
the visual buffer does not need to be employed for spatial mental
images. Kosslyn et al. (2006) states that the processing of spatial
and visual mental images occurs in parallel, i.e., the image of a
shape is generated while a spatial image is generated. They fur-
thermore state that this parallel processing might not always be
useful, as the proper construction of a shape requires informa-
tion about its spatial properties, i.e., location, size, and orientation
which are provided by a respective spatial mental image (Koss-
lyn et al., 2006, p. 143). For the generation of multi-part visual
mental images, a corresponding spatial mental image is necessary
to guide the placement of shapes in the visual buffer by speci-
fying the location, orientation, and size. The inspection process
can make previously implicit information in a visual or spatial
image explicit, i.e., new information is inferred. Visual mental
images are inspected by shifting an attention window over the
visual buffer. Through this inspection visual information, e.g.,
properties of a shape, as well as spatial information, e.g., spatial
relations, can be inferred. It is also possible that new informa-
tion is inferred from only a spatial mental image. However, no
detailed information on the inspection of/inference in spatial
mental images is provided by the theory. The function of image
maintenance is used to re-construct parts of mental images as the
information fades over time. The function of image manipula-
tion allows the imagination of transformations of mental images.
The theory posits that such manipulations are realized by alter-
ing the object map, i.e., the spatial mental image, underlying the
visual mental image. One would, for example, change the loca-
tion or size of an entity in the spatial mental image to alter the
visual mental image that contains the shape information of that
entity.
One interesting phenomenon of mental imagery is the obser-
vation of spontaneous eye movements during different visual
mental imagery tasks. Brandt and Stark (1997) had participants
imagine a previously memorized grid pattern and found that
the eye movements during imagination reflected the content of
the original stimuli. Spontaneous eye movements that reflect the
processed spatial relations during mental imagery have since been
found, for example, during imagination of natural scenes (Hol-
sanova et al., 1998), during imagination of detailed paintings
and detailed descriptions of scenes while facing a white board
as well as in total darkness (Johansson et al., 2006), during rea-
soning with “visual” syllogisms, e.g., “a jar of pickles is below a
box of tea bags,” (Demarais and Cohen, 1998), and while listen-
ing to verbal descriptions of spatial scenes, e.g., “at the bottom
there is a doorman in blue” (Spivey and Geng, 2001). Johansson
et al. (2012) report a series of experiments, in which partici-
pants were selectively forced to not move their eyes during mental
imagery. They found that the suppression of eye movements has
an impact on the quantity and quality of mental imagery. Their
results strongly indicate a functional role of eye movements during
mental imagery.
2.3. OPEN QUESTIONS
The previous two sections are summarized in Table 1 which
provides a comparative overview of the two theories. From the
comparison of the two theories, a great overlap in the assumptions
made and structures and processes proposed by the two theories is
evident. Many aspects of the two theories are revealed to be rather
similar, perhaps more similar than one would have expected. In
particular, they provide very similar descriptions of a spatial and a
visual mental representation with respect to information content,
localization, and hierarchical structure between the two repre-
sentations. There are, however, some diverging predictions with
respect to the modality of these representations and their role in
reasoning. In the following, we discuss these differences and iden-
tify two main questions that arise from the comparison of these
two theories.
The theory of mental imagery states that spatial mental
images are processed in a component called the spatial-properties-
processing subsystem. This subsystem is explicitly linked to the
dorsal processing stream, which processes spatial information dur-
ing visual perception (Kosslyn et al., 2006, p.138). Processing of
spatial mental images uses (at least partly) the same processes
used during processing of spatial information in visual percep-
tion. Mental models on the other hand are commonly assumed to
be amodal or multi-modal (e.g., Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991).
Accordingly, mental models are assumed to be used to also reason
about abstract, non-spatial, information, e.g., “A is better than B”
(Knauff et al., 2003), whereas spatial mental images are assumed
to process only spatial information. It has, however, been assumed
that abstract information, e.g., “better than,” can be translated
into spatial information in mental models (Knauff et al., 2003).
An opinion seemingly shared by Kosslyn (1994), who states that
information like “A is smarter than B” can be represented by dots
on a line in a spatial mental image which would then correspond
to a mental model in the sense of Johnson-Laird (Kosslyn, 1994,
p. 324). The question that remains is whether the spatial repre-
sentation, described as a mental model or a spatial mental image,
is actually amodal/multi-modal (as claimed by mental model the-
ory) or linked to the modality of visual perception (as seemingly
proposed by the theory of mental imagery). Results pointing either
way would help refining the theories.
Another open issue is the theories’ seemingly different predic-
tion on the role of the spatial mental representation in reasoning.
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Table 1 | Comparison of mental model theory and the theory of mental images.
Mental model theory Mental imagery
Mental model Mental image Spatial mental image Visual mental image
Structure Structurally analogical to
problem domain
(Johnson-Laird, 1998);
amodal or multi-modal
(Knauff and Johnson-Laird,
2002); spatio-analogical
(Knauff et al., 2003)
No concrete statements about
structure are made
Spatio-analogical
(Kosslyn et al., 2006);
described as
configuration of points
in space (Kosslyn, 1994,
p. 324)
Spatio-analogical, i.e., “depictive”
(Kosslyn, 1994)
Anatomical
localization
Parietal lobe plays a key
role in mental model
reasoning (Knauff et al.,
2003)
Occipital lobe (specifically V2)
(Knauff et al., 2003)
Posterior parietal lobe
(Kosslyn et al., 2006)
Topographically organized areas of
the occipital lobe (the visual buffer)
(Kosslyn and Thompson, 2003)
Relationship
between the two
representations
Mental images are special cases of mental models (Johnson-
Laird, 1998). Reasoning is realized with mental models
(Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002)
Spatial mental images (object maps) set spatial parameters, e.g.,
location, size, and orientation for the shapes represented in a visual
mental image (Kosslyn et al., 2006); a visual mental image repre-
sents a “visualized” part of a spatial mental image (Kosslyn et al.,
2006, p. 138)
Content Abstract relations, e.g.,
ownership, “worse than,”
and spatial relations, e.g.,
orientation, distance,
topology (for an overview,
see Johnson-Laird, 2001)
Visual information, e.g., visual
configuration seen from a certain
perspective (Johnson-Laird,
1998)
Spatial properties, e.g.,
location, size,
orientation (Kosslyn
et al., 2006)
Visual/object properties, e.g., shape
information, color, depth (Kosslyn
et al., 2006)
Processes Model construction, model
inspection, model variation
(Johnson-Laird and Byrne,
1991)
Mental images can be
constructed from visualizable
parts of an underlying mental
model (Johnson-Laird, 1998);
insights from image
manipulation are reinterpreted
within the underlying mental
model (Johnson-Laird, 1998)
Construction, inspection, maintenance, manipulation (Kosslyn,
1994); inspection (including inference of new information) of visual
mental images is explained by employing processes of visual per-
ception on the content of the visual buffer; inference from spatial
mental images is possible
Typical
experimental
paradigms
Different (often spatial)
syllogisms without any
references to visual
imagination (for an
overview, see
Johnson-Laird, 2001)
Syllogisms with visual but
non-spatial relations, e.g.,
“dirtier than” (Knauff and
Johnson-Laird, 2002)
To our knowledge there
is no paradigm to
specifically induce
spatial mental images
“Imagine,” “try to see mentally”
(e.g., Kosslyn, 1973, 1980;
Chambers and Reisberg, 1985;
Borst et al., 2006)
Phenomena
unique to theory
Preferred mental models (e.g., Jahn et al., 2007) Spontaneous eye movements corresponding to the processed
content in mental images (e.g., Johansson et al., 2006, 2012)
Unfortunately, both theories remain vague regarding the details of
how spatial and visual representations interact during reasoning.
In mental model theory it is often explicitly stated that it is men-
tal models and not mental images that underlie human reasoning
(Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002; Knauff et al., 2003). The auto-
matic generation of mental images through “visual” relations, e.g.,
“the dog is dirtier than the cat” is even considered to impede the
reasoning process that happens on the level of mental models
(Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002). Of course, mental images
can be important for reasoning if certain visual information is
necessary, but it is not described how such visual information
would be interpreted by nor how it would be transferred into
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the mental model for further reasoning. In the theory of mental
imagery, it is made clear that visual mental images play a major
role in reasoning: “[I]magery plays a critical role in many types of
reasoning” (Kosslyn, 1994, p.404). And, contrasting mental model
theory, visual mental images are assumed to be much more than
just the provider of visual information for spatial mental images, in
general, and particularly in reasoning (Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al.,
2006). The inspection of visual mental images constructed in the
visual buffer can lead to new insights and is thus directly involved
in the reasoning processes. According to Kosslyn et al. (2006) a
visual mental image is generated using an underlying spatial men-
tal image. However, the concrete role of the spatial mental image
in the reasoning process is never elaborated in a way that would
suggest that the spatial mental image is of specific importance to
reasoning or even that it might be the actual reasoning component
(as proposed in mental model theory).
Summarizing, we pointed out two main open issues regarding
the differences between spatial mental representations and visual
mental representations: (1) whether the spatial mental represen-
tation is rather amodal/multi-modal or whether it is also directly
linked to visual perception like the visual mental representation;
(2) to which extent the two mental representations are involved
in reasoning, i.e., whether the spatial mental representation is the
primary reasoning component or not.
3. EXPERIMENTS
The comparison of the two theories, furthermore, showed that
there are phenomena which have mostly been investigated only
within the framework of one of the two theories. Preferences in
under-specified problems have so far only been investigated within
the framework of mental model theory while eye movements have
been a focus of investigation almost only with mental images. In
the presented experiments, we investigated to which extent these
two phenomena are transferable to the respectively other type of
mental representation. That is, we checked for spontaneous eye
movements during reasoning with a spatial mental representa-
tion, i.e., a (spatial) mental model, and we checked for possible
preferences when employing a visual mental representation, i.e., a
visual mental image. In the following, we describe how the inves-
tigation of these phenomena informs us about the open questions
stated in Section 3.3.
The tasks used in the experiments are three-term series rela-
tional reasoning problems about orientation knowledge. The two
experiments differed only in their instructions which were for-
mulated so that they induced the employment of a spatial men-
tal representation in the first experiments and a visual mental
representation in the second experiment.
We assume that we will confirm the findings of the literature
that systematic eye movements occur during the second experi-
ment (employing a visual mental representation) and that there
are significant preferences in the answers of the participants in
the first experiment (employing a spatial mental representation).
The apparent functional role of eye movements during visual
mental imagery provides strong evidence that visual mental rep-
resentations are linked to processes of visual perception. These
spontaneous eye movements reflect the spatial relations of the
processed information. Both mental model theory and the theory
of mental imagery assume spatial relations to be represented by
a spatial mental representation, which supports the construction
of a visual mental representation by providing the required spa-
tial information. We tested whether such eye movements along
the processed spatial relations would occur during employment
of only a spatial mental representation, i.e., without the represen-
tation of visual content. The investigation of eye movements in
this context can inform us about the question of the modality of
spatial mental representations: if systematic eye movements occur
during reasoning with spatial mental representations, then this
would be a strong indication that mental models are not amodal,
but are, in fact, linked to attentional processes of visual percep-
tion. A lack of systematic eye movements during reasoning with
spatial mental representations, on the other hand, would support
the assumption of mental model theory that mental models are
amodal. More specifically, this would indicate that the processes of
spatial mental representations do not employ the overt attentional
processes of visual perception as it is the case for visual mental
representations.
Preferred mental models are preferences for certain answers
to under-specified reasoning problems that have been found for
reasoning with mental models. These preferences are assumed
to emerge because participants first construct one, perhaps the
most parsimonious, mental model out of several valid models
(e.g., Rauh et al., 2005). Visual mental images are also assumed
to “depict” just one situation at a time; in fact it is hard to
imagine how a “depictive” representation could represent more
than one situation simultaneously. There are three possible out-
comes for our investigation of such preferences for reasoning with
visual mental representations: (1) we find no significant preferred
answers, (2) we find different preferences for the two mental rep-
resentations, or (3) we find the same preferences in reasoning
with both mental representations. Finding no significant pref-
erences in the answers when a visual mental representation is
employed would strongly indicate that the assumption that visual
mental representations build upon corresponding spatial men-
tal representations is incorrect. Furthermore, this would indicate
that the construction of visual mental representations can be sub-
ject to very strong individual differences. Such a finding seems
unlikely and would not be predicted by any of the two theo-
ries. Should we find the same preferences in both experiments,
i.e., for reasoning with both a spatial and a visual mental rep-
resentation, the assumption of a hierarchal relationship between
the two mental representations would be supported. This would
strongly suggest that indeed the spatial configuration of a visual
mental representation is taken from an underlying spatial men-
tal representation. Should we find different preferences for the
two mental representations, refinements of both mental model
theory and the theory of mental imagery would be required to
explain this disparity. In particular, such a finding would challenge
the two theories to elaborate on their assumption that the con-
struction of visual mental representations depends on an under-
lying spatial mental representation. Additionally, the strong claim
made by mental model theory that reasoning is realized by spa-
tial mental representations and not visual mental representations
would without additional hypotheses be contradicted by this
result.
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In the following, the materials and methods employed in both
conducted experiments are described.
3.1. MATERIALS AND APPARATUS
The tasks used in the experiments are under-specified three-term
series problems about orientation knowledge, specifically cardi-
nal directions. We chose these problems because problems of this
type, i.e., three-term series relational spatial reasoning, have been
used in several studies of mental model theory before (e.g., Knauff
et al., 2003; Byrne and Johnson-Laird, 1989; Schultheis et al., in
revision). We use an eight-sector model of cardinal directions,
i.e., the eight directions are north, north-east, east, south-east,
south, south-west, west, and north-west. The problems are of the
following form:
Premise 1: A is [direction 1] of B, e.g., A is north of B
Premise 2: B is [direction 2] of C, e.g., B is east of C
Conclusion: As seen from A, where is C?
The premises provide two spatial relations between three enti-
ties and the third spatial relation has to be inferred. In general,
these problems are under-specified, i.e., there can be more than
one correct conclusion given the premises. We used two classes of
these problems, which we term 45˚ problems and 90˚ problems.
These problems can be visualized as triangles with one of the three
edges missing. This missing edge corresponds to the to-be-inferred
spatial relation. We used all possible combinations in which the
two given edges form either a 45˚ or a 90˚ angle. Figure 1 depicts
an overview of all these problems.
We can identify all possible correct solutions for the two prob-
lem sets. The 90˚ problems have three possible solutions and the 45˚
problems have 4 possible solutions. The different configurations
leading to these solutions are depicted in Figure 2. To distinguish
the different solutions, we classify the underlying mental represen-
tations based on a visualization of the solution as triangles. In this
context we use the term“model” to describe the underlying mental
configuration, whether it might be a spatial mental representation
or a visual mental representation. Models with very different dis-
tances for the given spatial relations are termed distorted models
(DM); models with roughly equal distances for the given rela-
tions are termed equal-distance models (EDM). The remaining
valid solution for the 45˚ problems, the third solution in Figure 2,
always leads to one of the four main cardinal directions being
inferred and is therefore termed cardinal model (CM).
There are 16 different possible problems. We used them all
twice with different letters resulting in a total of 32 problems. The
16 different problems consist of eight 45˚ and eight 90˚ problems,
as depicted in Figure 1.
Participants wore a head-mounted SensoMotoric Instruments
(SMI) iView X HED eye tracker with a 200 Hz sampling rate
to record their eye movements. To prevent expectancy effects,
participants were told that the experiment investigates the size
of their pupils. A post-experimental questionnaire verified that
participants were not aware of the eye tracking.
FIGURE 1 |The 16 different types of problems used in the experiments. The upper eight are 45˚ problems and the lower eight are 90˚ problems.
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FIGURE 2 | Possible valid models for a 45˚ problem are depicted as 1, 2, 3,
and 4. Possible valid models for a 90˚ problem are depicted as 5, 6, and 7. The
models 1, 4, 5, and 7 are termed distorted models (DM) because the
distances between the entities vary a lot from each other. The models 2 and 6
have equal distances and are termed equal-distance models (EDM). The
model 3 is termed cardinal model (CM) because the to-be-inferred relation
corresponds to one of the main cardinal directions, i.e., north, east, south, or
west.
3.2. PROCEDURE
3.2.1. Instructions
The two experiments used slightly different instructions, so that
they conformed with the usual instructions of both studies on
mental models as well as studies on visual mental images. At the
same time, the minimal change between the experiments helped to
keep the tasks as similar as possible and minimize any differences
besides the induced mental representation.
The instructions of the first experiment did not contain any
suggestions to use visualization or visual information, but simply
asked participants to infer the missing relation as fast and as accu-
rately as possible. It is in line with previous experimental studies
to assume the employment of mental models, i.e., a spatial men-
tal representation, based on the fact that no visual information is
required, given or asked for in the task (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2001;
Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002; Jahn et al., 2007).
The instructions of the second experiment only differed slightly
from those of the first one. The participants were told that the let-
ters represent cities that are to be imagined as little red squares
with the respective letter next to them, which are all placed on
a map. This slight variation made the instructions conform with
those of several other visual mental imagery studies, i.e., using
phrases such as “imagine [. . .]” or “try to mentally see [. . .]” (e.g.,
Kosslyn et al., 1983; Chambers and Reisberg, 1985; Borst et al.,
2006).
In both experiments participants were asked to work as
accurately and as fast as possible.
3.2.2. Setup
Participants were seated facing a blank white wall at a distance of
approximately 1 m. Their hands were placed on their legs under a
table holding a computer mouse in the one hand and a small ball
in the other one. This was to prevent participants from using their
fingers as an aid to solve the tasks. The eye tracker was mounted
on the participant’s head and calibrated. All initial instructions of
the experiment were projected on the white wall.
3.2.3. Learning phase
The experiment started with a learning phase to familiarize the
participants with the cardinal directions. The learning phase con-
sisted of acoustically presented statements and an answer screen
with a question. Each statement was of the form “K is [direction]
of U.” After 4 s the answer screen appeared, which depicted
the reference entity U surrounded by the numbers 1 to 8 in a
counterclockwise circular order together with the question “As
seen from U, where is K?” The eight numbers represented the
eight cardinal directions (1= north, 2= north-west, 3=west, . . .
8= north-east). Participants answered by naming the respective
number. In case of an incorrect answer, the correct answer was
projected on the wall. The training phase ended as soon as each
of the eight cardinal directions was recognized correctly twice in
a row.
3.2.4. Problem trials
Participants were presented with a total of 48 trials. Out of those
the first four were pre-trials intended to familiarize the partici-
pants with the form and procedure of the problems. Out of the
remaining 44 trials, 12 were designed as filler trials. These filler
trials differed in the order in which the entities were presented:
AB, AC, BC, e.g., “A is north of B; A is west of C; B is? of C,” in
contrast to the order of the remaining 32 problem trials: AB, BC,
CA, e.g., “A is north of B; B is east of C; C is? of A.” The filler trials
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served a double purpose. First, they were meant to prevent mem-
ory effects due to the identical order of all problem trials. Second,
filler trials were employed to identify those time intervals in which
participants show eye movements along the given directions. We
elaborate on this method in Section 4.3. After the presentation
of the four pre-trials, the remaining 44 trials were presented in
randomized order.
3.2.5. Presentation
All premises and questions were presented acoustically. There was
no projection on the white wall during the premises; after the
conclusion phase an answer screen was projected onto the wall.
Participants used the mouse to trigger the acoustic presentation of
the first premise in each trial. As soon as they understood the state-
ment, they clicked again for the presentation of the second premise.
Similarly, they triggered the acoustic presentation of the question
after having understood the second premise. Only after partici-
pants found an answer, they clicked the mouse again making the
answer screen appear. The answer screen was the same as the one
used in the learning phase. Participants verbally gave their answer
by naming the number associated with the resulting direction. Par-
ticipants continued to the next trial by clicking the mouse again.
The participants took between 35 and 50 min to complete the
experiment.
3.3. PROCESSING OF THE EYE TRACKING DATA
We processed the eye tracking data to identify whether eye move-
ments occurred along the spatial relations given in each trial. We
employed the same method for both experiments.
The raw eye tracking data collected by the iView X software
was first converted using the IDF Event Detector to generate a
list of fixations made by the participant. Saccades were calcu-
lated automatically from the sequence and coordinates of the
participant’s fixations. Using the starting and ending coordinates
of each saccade, we classified them into one of eight categories
corresponding to the eight cardinal directions used in the tri-
als. All possible angles of a saccade, interpreted as a vector in
a Cartesian plane, were uniformly mapped to the set of cardi-
nal directions. Each direction corresponds to a range of angles
on the degree circle with each direction taking up (360˚/8)= 45˚.
For example, north corresponded to all angles in the range of
0˚± (45˚/2)= 0˚± 22.5˚= [337.5˚; 22.5˚]. Note that the eye move-
ments classified in this way are relative eye movements, i.e., the
absolute coordinates do not matter. This is reasonable consid-
ering that participants moved their head during trials and that
arbitrary eye movements occurred in between. Given this classi-
fication, we were able to investigate a possible coupling between
the given direction and observed eye movements during a trial.
If eye movements are linked to the processing of spatial relations,
we expected eye movements to occur not only along the given
direction, but also along the opposite one. Assuming a mental
representation of, for example, A being north of B, it is plausible
to not only expect attention shifts from A to B but also from B to
A during inspection as well as construction of the representation.
Thus, we always compared the absolute number of observed sac-
cades to the sum of saccades made along the given and the opposite
direction. For the first premise, we used the given direction, e.g.,
for the premise A is north of B we looked for saccades along the
north-south axis. For the second premise, we used the direction
given in the first premise as well as the new direction given in the
second premise, e.g., for B is west of C, we looked for north-south
(from premise 1) and for east-west. For the conclusion phase, we
used the direction (and its opposite) that was given as the answer
by the participant. We applied a binomial test with a probability of
1/4 to test whether the two expected directions were above chance
for each participant for the first premise and the conclusion. For
the second premise we applied a binomial test with a probability
of 1/2 to test whether the four expected directions (two directions
from each relation of the two premises) were above chance. For
each phase we then applied a binomial test with a probability of
0.05 to check whether the number of participants showing signifi-
cant eye movements is significantly above chance. The probability
of 0.05 corresponds to how often a false positive of the previous
binomial test is expected.
No prior information was available on when during the pro-
cessing of the premises or the conclusion eye movements are to be
expected. It is likely that participants spent some time understand-
ing and verbally processing the presented premise or question
before they started constructing the mental representation. Sim-
ilarly, participants required some time preparing the action of
clicking the mouse to trigger the next step after they finished the
processing of the respective premise or question. We, therefore,
used the obtained data during the first premises of the filler tri-
als to gather information on when exactly participants started
showing eye movements and whether we could find a tempo-
ral pattern. We only looked at eye movements during the first
premise, because the filler trials are identical to the problem trials
for the first premise. The difference in the order of the presented
letters only became evident with the second premise. Therefore, we
assumed the same behavior in the first premises of both the prob-
lem and the filler trials. We looked at the time interval between
the first mention of the direction in the first premise and the time
participants click to initiate the second premise. This interval was
divided into ten equally long time slots. For each of these ten
slots we summed up the eye movements of all participants for
each experiment. We checked whether eye movements along the
expected directions, i.e., those given in the respective premise (and
its opposite), were significantly above chance in each of these inter-
vals. We applied a binomial test using a probability of 1/4 for each
of the four pairs of cardinal directions, e.g., north/south compared
to east/west, north-east/south-west, and north-west/south-east.
We applied this method independently for both experiments and
used the identified time slots for the eye movement analysis of the
problem trials.
3.4. ETHICS STATEMENT
The study was conducted within the Collaborative Research Cen-
ter Spatial Cognition SFB/TR 8 funded by the German Research
Foundation (DFG). The DFG’s board of ethics passed the research
proposal that underlies the present study. DFG-funded projects
do not require additional approval by other ethics committees.
The studies are in full agreement with the ethical guidelines of the
German Psychological Society (DGPs). Written informed consent
was acquired from all participants.
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4. RESULTS
4.1. EXPERIMENT 1: SPATIAL MENTAL REPRESENTATION
4.1.1. Participants
Thirty undergraduate students of the University of Bremen, 12
male and 18 female, volunteered to take part in the experiment for
monetary compensation.
Out of the 30 participants, one aborted the experiment and
four were discarded due to an error rate of more than 30% incor-
rectly answered trials. The remaining 25 participants comprised
11 males and 14 females. The 0.05 level of significance was used
for all statistical tests in both experiments.
4.1.2. Preferences
For the analysis of the preferences we discarded those trials for
which the participants gave no or incorrect answers (12% of all tri-
als). We compared the answers of all participants for all remaining
trials to identify possible preferences. We differentiated between
90˚ and 45˚ problems and assumed that the given answers indicate
the employment of the corresponding model. If no preferences
existed, one would expect to observe distorted models and equal-
distance models in 66% and 33% of all 90˚ problem trials, respec-
tively. Likewise, distorted models, equal-distance models, and car-
dinal models should occur in 50%, 25%, and 25% of all 45˚ prob-
lem trials, respectively. To check for the existence of preferences, we
compared the observed model percentages to these hypothetical
ones. Figure 3 shows the resulting preferences for both problem
FIGURE 3 | Preferences in the first experiment. The vertical axis
represents the frequency of the given answer. Top: 90˚ problems; bottom:
45˚ problems. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. EDM,
equal-distance model; CM, cardinal model; DM, distorted models.
types. There is a clear preference for the equal-distance model
in the 90˚ problems. The answer corresponding to this model
was given in 88.34% of all trials (t (24)= 17.233; p< 0.001). The
distorted models were employed significantly less than expected
by chance with 11.66% (t (24)=−17.233; p< 0.001). We found
a significant preference for the equal-distance model in the 45˚
problems with 62.88% (t (24)= 5.352; p< 0.001), whereas the
23.46% of the cardinal model did not differ significantly from
the expected value (t (24)=−0.215; p> 0.8). The distorted models
were used significantly less than expected by chance with 13.66%
(t (24)=−9.995; p< 0.001).
4.1.3. Eye movements
Table 2 shows the time slots identified by analyzing the eye move-
ments during the filler trials. We used the last six out of ten time
slots for our analysis of the eye movements during the actual
problem trials. We decided to use all six slots despite the fact that
two out of those did not show significant eye movements in the
filler trials, because it is plausible that processing was not inter-
rupted in between, but ran continuously after participants have
understood the premise. Table 3 shows that the amount of partic-
ipants showing eye movements along the given directions is not
significant in neither the first nor the second premise (all p> 0.35),
but significant during the conclusion phase (p< 0.05).
The left parts of the Figures 4 and 5 show diagrams of the
recorded eye movements during all first premises of the form A is
west of B and A is north-west of B, respectively. It is evident that the
percentage of saccades along the given direction and the oppos-
ing direction are not above chance, i.e., 12.5%, for both types of
premises.
4.2. EXPERIMENT 2: VISUAL MENTAL REPRESENTATION
4.2.1. Participants
Thirty one undergraduate students of the University of Bremen,
15 male and 16 female, participated in the study for monetary
compensation.
Eight of the 31 participants were discarded due to an error rate
of more than 30% incorrectly answered trials. The remaining 23
participants comprised 12 males and 11 females.
Table 2 | Analysis of eye tracking data from the first premise of all filler
trials.
Time slot Experiment 1 Experiment 2
1 0.2353 0.6601
2 0.7297 0.8378
3 0.3143 0.4950
4 0.8286 0.0122*
5 0.0169* 0.1991
6 0.0080* 0.0082*
7 0.1388 0.0097*
8 0.0299* 0.0181*
9 0.1463 0.0000*
10 0.0404* 0.0018*
We applied a binomial test to see whether the eye movements along the given
direction (and its opposite) are above the expected value of chance (1/4) within
each time slot. Significance is based on an error probability of 0.05.
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4.2.2. Preferences
Preferences were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1.
We discarded those trials for which the participants gave no or
an incorrect answer for the analysis of the preferences (9% of all
Table 3 |The number of participants showing significant eye
movements along the given directions.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Premise 1 2 out of 25 9 out of 23*
Premise 2 2 out of 25 4 out of 23*
Conclusion 4 out of 25* 5 out of 23*
Significance is based on an error probability of 0.05.
trials). Figure 6 shows the preferences for both problem types.
For the 90˚ problems, the equal-distance model was used in 93.2%
of all trials, which shows a significant preference (t (22)= 29.350;
p< 0.001). Consequently, the distorted models are employed sig-
nificantly below chance with 6.8% (t (22)=−29.350; p< 0.001).
For the 45˚ problems, we found a significant preference for the
equal-distance model with 46.32% (t (22)= 2.512; p< 0.05) as well
as for the cardinal model with 47.9% (t (22)= 2.683; p< 0.05). The
distorted models were used significantly less compared to their
expected value with 5.78% (t (22)=−25.360; p< 0.001).
4.2.3. Eye movements
Table 2 shows the time slots during which participants showed
significant eye movements during the filler trials. Based on this,
we used the last seven out of ten time slots for the eye movement
FIGURE 4 | Distribution of eye movements during first premises of the form “A is west of B.” Amplitude represents the percentage of saccades mapped
onto the respective cardinal direction.
FIGURE 5 | Distribution of eye movements during first premises of the form “A is north-west of B.” Amplitude represents the percentage of saccades
mapped onto the respective cardinal direction.
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FIGURE 6 | Preferences in the second experiment. The vertical axis
represents the frequency of the given answer. Top: 90˚ problems; bottom:
45˚ problems. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. EDM,
equal-distance model; CM, cardinal model; DM, distorted models.
analysis for the problem trials. We decided to use all seven slots
despite the fact that one out of those did not contain significant eye
movements, because we assumed, just as in the first experiment,
that processing is not paused in between. Contrasting the first
experiment, we found a significant amount of participants show-
ing significant eye movements during all three phases (Prem. 1:
p< 0.001; Prem. 2: p< 0.05; Concl.: p< 0.01) as shown in Table 3.
The right parts of the Figures 4 and 5 show diagrams of the
recorded eye movements during all first premises of the form A is
west of B and A is north-west of B, respectively. The Figures show
that saccades along the given direction as well as the opposing
direction are above the frequency of chance (i.e., 12.5%) for both
types of premises.
4.2.4. Comparison of eye-movers to non-eye-movers
Based on the literature, we expected to find spontaneous eye
movements corresponding to the processed spatial relations when
a visual mental representation is employed. In line with this
assumption, a majority of participants exhibited systematic eye
movements. We compared the participants that showed a signifi-
cant amount of eye movements along the given directions in any
of the phases (both premises or the conclusion) with those that
did not show significant eye movements in any of the phases.
Given this definition, 13 out of the 23 participants qualified as
eye-movers; the 10 remaining participants will be referred to as
non-eye-movers.
There was no significant difference between eye-movers and
non-eye-movers regarding error rate, reaction times, and sex (all
p> 0.19). The eye-movers and non-eye-movers, however, showed
different preferences for the 45˚ problems as shown in Figure 7.
The eye-movers showed a significant preference for the cardi-
nal direction model with 54.84% (t (12)= 2.7884; p< 0.05). The
equal-distance model was not significantly preferred with 37.85%
(t (12)= 1.2527; p> 0.23) and the distorted models were employed
significantly less than expected with 7.31% (t (12)=−16.1961;
p< 0.001). The non-eye-movers showed no significant prefer-
ence for the cardinal direction model with 38.88% (t (9)= 0.994;
p> 0.34) but for the equal-distance model with 57.32%
(t (9)= 2.2926; p< 0.05). The distorted models were significantly
below expectation with 3.8% (t (9)=−22.3421; p< 0.001).
4.3. COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIMENTS
In the first experiment, it is only during the conclusion phase that
the number of participants that showed systematic eye movements
becomes significant. This finding seems unexpected given that the
number of eye-movers of the second experiment is highest during
the first premise whereas the number of eye-movers in the first
experiment is not significant for neither premise. Furthermore,
analysis of the eye movements should be most accurate for the first
premise as participants are only aware of one spatial relation at that
time and all saccades along the other directions can be assumed
not to have any relation to the mental representation constructed.
In contrast, during the second premise or the conclusion, all three
spatial relations are (at least implicitly) available to the participant
and could also result in eye movements, which would, however,
not all be counted as “correct” eye movements, because we only
checked for the spatial relations of the two premises during the
second premise and we only checked for the relation that is given
as the answer during the conclusion. Thus, the chance for find-
ing significant eye movements during specifically the conclusion
phase should be lower than for the first premise. It can, accord-
ingly, be argued that eye movements during the conclusion phase
did not necessarily result from the internal processing of spatial
relations but that some participants moved their gaze in antici-
pation of the answer screen. The answer screen was projected on
the wall just after participants clicked to indicate they found an
answer. A saccade from the middle of their visual field toward the
appropriate number on the answer screen, i.e., the number which
represents their given answer, would have been mapped onto the
cardinal direction that corresponds to their answer. Thus, there is
reason to doubt that the significant number of eye-movers that we
find for the conclusion phase in the first experiment is a result of
the employed mental representation.
Given the lack of spontaneous eye movements along the
processed relations for the non-eye-movers of the second experi-
ment, we conclude that these participants did not employ a visual
mental representation. This conclusion is based on the literature
(see Section 3.2) which shows that employment of visual mental
representations is related to the occurrence of such spontaneous
eye movements and, furthermore, that these eye movements have a
functional role in the employment of visual mental representations
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FIGURE 7 | Preferences of the 45˚ problems in the second experiment.
The vertical axis represents the frequency of the given answer. Top:
non-eye-movers; bottom: eye-movers. Error bars show the standard error of
the mean. EDM, equal-distance model; CM, cardinal model; DM, distorted
models.
(Johansson et al., 2012). It may be that the non-eye-movers likely
used a spatial mental representation like the participants of the
first experiment; this conclusion does, however, not follow from
the observation or the literature. We, therefore, remain agnostic
regarding the mental representation of the non-eye-movers of the
second experiment.
4.3.1. Comparing reasoning with visual and spatial mental
representations
As the two experiments consisted of the same task with only slightly
different instructions, we compared participants across the exper-
iments1. Reaction times that were outside a 2.5∗SD range from the
1There is evidence that the (a priori) differences between the two groups of the two
experiments were not more substantial or qualitatively different than if the groups
had resulted from random assignments within a single experiment. First, the partici-
pants of both experiments were recruited from the same population of students from
the University of Bremen. The setup of the two experiments was identical apart from
the variation in instructions. This includes specifically the equipment, the room, the
experimenter, and the materials. The experiments were conducted within two con-
secutive semesters. Second, the two groups did not significantly differ with respect to
sex (χ2(1) = 1.42, p > 0.2) or field of study (χ2(2) = 1.18, p > 0.5). The two groups
also did not differ significantly in their age (t (46)= –1.084; p> 0.28, two-tailed) or
performance in the paper-folding test (t (46)= –0.455; p> 0.65, two-tailed). Third,
using the method described in Masson (2011), the participants age and performance
mean reaction time of the corresponding phase (first and second
premise and the conclusion) were excluded from analysis (3%).
In order to compare the employment of visual mental repre-
sentations with that of spatial mental representations, we defined
two groups: the visual group and the spatial group. The spatial
group comprises all participants of the first experiment. The eye-
movers of the second experiment constitute the visual group. That
is, the spatial group contains those participants which employed
a spatial mental representation and the visual group contains
those that employed a visual mental representation. There were
no significant differences regarding error rate, reaction times, and
sex (all p> 0.35) between the visual and the spatial group. How-
ever, the preferences of the two groups differed as indicated by a
significant interaction between group (spatial or visual) and type
of model (cardinal or equal-distance), F (1,36)= 5.644,p< 0.05.
Figure 8 shows the preferences of the visual and the spatial
group. The spatial group showed a preference for the equal-
distance model (EDM) but not for the cardinal model (CM).
In contrast, the visual group showed a preference for the car-
dinal model (CM) but not the equal-distance model (EDM).
Table 4 shows an overview of the preferences for the different
groups and experiments. Interestingly, the non-eye-movers of the
second experiment showed the same preferences as the partici-
pants of the first experiment, i.e., a significant preference for the
equal-distance model (EDM) and no significant preference for
the cardinal model (CM). This may be taken to indicate that the
non-eye-movers employed a spatial mental representation despite
the fact that the instructions are formulated to induce a visual
mental representation.
5. DISCUSSION
The conducted experiments yielded two main results. First, the
employed reasoning task led to no significant systematic eye move-
ments when a spatial mental representation was employed, i.e.,
for the spatial group. In contrast, we found significant systematic
eye movements for a majority of the participants in the second
experiment, i.e., the visual group which employed a visual men-
tal representation. Second, there are significant preferences in the
answers for the under-specified problems in both the visual and
the spatial group. The preferences did, however, differ between the
employed mental representations.
These results relate to the two main open issues about the rela-
tionship between spatial and visual mental representation (identi-
fied in Section 3.3): (1) whether spatial mental representations are
modality-specific, and (2) whether human visuo-spatial reasoning
is realized on the level of spatial mental representations.
Regarding the first issue, we observed systematic eye move-
ments in the second experiment but not for the first experiment.
The eye movements observed in second experiment, i.e., the one
in which the employment of a visual mental representation was
induced, corroborate several studies reporting spontaneous eye
movements during visual mental imagery. The fact that we did
not find these eye movements for the essentially same reasoning
task in the first experiment, i.e., the one in which the employment
in the paper-folding test, provided positive evidence for the null hypothesis that the
two groups did not differ (p(H 0|D)= 0.79, p(H 0|D)= 0.86, respectively).
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FIGURE 8 | Preferences of the 45˚ problems for the spatial group (top)
and the visual group (bottom). The vertical axis represents the frequency
of the given answer. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. EDM,
equal-distance model; CM, cardinal model; DM, distorted models.
Table 4 | Comparison of preferences for the 45˚ problems between
different groups; S+, frequency significantly above chance; S−,
frequency significantly below chance; NS, frequency does not
significantly differ from chance; CM, cardinal model; EDM,
equal-distance model; DM, distorted models.
Group CM EDM DM
Exp 1 (spatial group) NS S+ S−
Exp 1, eye-mover NS S+ S−
Exp 1, non-eye-mover NS S+ S−
Exp 2 S+ S+ S−
Exp 2, eye-mover (visual group) S+ NS S−
Exp 2, non-eye-mover NS S+ S−
of a spatial mental representation was induced, suggests that other
(attentional) processes are employed when reasoning with spatial
mental representations. Since eye movements have been found to
play a functional role in processing visual mental representations
(Johansson et al., 2012) and are therefore not epiphenomenal, we
can conclude that reasoning with visual mental representations
draws on overt attentional processes of visual perception and rea-
soning with spatial mental representations does not. This finding
lends support to the assumption of mental model theory that
spatial mental representations are amodal or multi-modal.
Regarding the second issue – whether reasoning is realized on
the level of spatial mental representations – our results show differ-
ent preferences depending on the employed mental representation.
The visual group showed a significant preference for the cardinal
model (CM) but not for the equal-distance model (EDM) for the
45˚ problems. In contrast, the spatial group showed a significant
preference for the equal-distance model (EDM) but not for the
cardinal model (CM) for the 45˚ problems. Mental model theory
assumes that the hierarchical relationship between visual mental
representations and spatial mental representations is such that rea-
soning happens on the level of the spatial mental representation
(Knauff and Johnson-Laird, 2002; Knauff et al., 2003) specifically
when visual information is irrelevant to the task at hand (as it is
the case in the presented experiments). This assumption seems in
contradiction to the presented results. The fact that we observed
different preferences for the two mental representations for essen-
tially the same reasoning task challenges the claim that reasoning
is based on spatial mental representations. This similarly affects
the theory of mental imagery which also states that visual mental
representations require underlying spatial mental representations.
In order to construct, inspect and reason with a visual representa-
tion, spatial information is necessary to, for example, “know” the
location, size, and spatial relations of the shapes that make up a
visual mental representation. The results of the experiments are
thus hard to reconcile with both the mental model theory and
the theory of mental imagery. The assumed hierarchical relation-
ship between spatial and visual mental representations has to be
extended with additional explanations about how spatial infor-
mation is transformed or processed differently in a visual mental
representation. In the following, we interpret the results on the
preferences with respect to this assumption of the two theories.
The preferred answer given by participants in the spatial group
was such that the spatial configuration of the problem has equal
distances between the entities. In contrast, the preferred answer
of the participants in the visual group was such that the spatial
configuration contains distances of different length. This is espe-
cially puzzling given the assumption that those spatial relations
are supposed to be provided by the spatial mental representation
to the visual mental representation. Sticking with the assumption
that the spatial information is provided by the underlying spatial
representation, one can think of two general explanations: (1) the
spatial relations are somehow altered in the context of a visual
representation, or (2) the spatial relations are the same but are
processed differently in the two mental representations. Regard-
ing the first option, spatial relations might become more specified
when represented in a visual mental representation (Schultheis
et al., 2007). That is, additional properties such as distance are
specified. On the level of the spatial mental representation, dis-
tance might only be represented with generic default values. This
would fit with the preferred mental model of the spatial group,
in which all distances are equal. This option is furthermore sup-
ported by an assumption of mental model theory: “[w]hen people
understand spatial descriptions, they imagine symmetrical arrays
in which adjacent objects have roughly equal distances between
them [. . .]” (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991, p. 94). Regarding
the second option, the way spatial relations are processed could
differ between the two mental representations. This explanation
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would fit well with the fact that we found spontaneous eye move-
ments that align with the currently processed spatial relations for
the visual group, but we did not find such eye movements for the
spatial group. An implementation of the second option is proposed
by a new model of visuo-spatial mental imagery in which process-
ing of spatial relations is affected by additional visual information
and realized by attention shifts such as eye movements (Sima, 2011;
Sima and Freksa, 2012).
6. CONCLUSION
Our experiments provided two new insights on the so far little
investigated relationship between visual and spatial mental repre-
sentations: (1) visual and spatial mental representations differ in
their employment of overt attentional processes of visual percep-
tion, (2) there are preferences when employing visual mental rep-
resentations just as for spatial mental representations, but the pref-
erences can differ for the same reasoning task. These findings are
hard to reconcile with current theories on visuo-spatial processing
and challenge some of their assumptions. Future work is neces-
sary to shed more light on the exact relationship between visual
and spatial mental representations. This will have to include the
refinement of the existing theoretical frameworks on the one hand
as well as further empirical research on the other hand. Regarding
the theories, we have additionally presented a systematic compar-
ison of mental model theory and the theory of mental imagery.
This comparison showed that the two theories that are often inves-
tigated separately likely investigate the same visual and spatial
mental representations. This comparison might serve as the basis
of a new unified theory combining the results achieved within both
mental model theory and the theory of mental imagery. Regard-
ing the future empirical work, the presented experiments show
one way of comparing visual and spatial mental representations
while keeping the experimental task essentially the same.
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